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RESEARCH NOTE: TWO DECADES AFTER
PEOPLE V. ANDERSON
Jonathan R. Sorenson*
James W. Marquart**
Madhava R. Bodapati***t
I.

INTRODUCTION

In February 1972, the California Supreme Court concluded, in People v. Anderson,1 that the death penalty was both cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution.2 The court made this
decision exclusive of federal constitutional concerns.3 Therefore, it was
unaffected by the subsequent 1972 decision, Furman v. Georgia,4 in
* Jonathan R. Sorenson is an Assistant Professor, Department of Criminal Justice Administration, Central Missouri State University. His research interests include the legalities of
drug testing in criminal justice organizations, the accuracy ofjury predictions in capital cases
and the history of capital punishment in Texas. ** James W. Marquart is an Associate Professor, College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston University. His research emphasizes the long-term consequences of litigation on prison
organizations. He is currently conducting a historical analysis of capital punishment in Texas
from 1924-1988.
*** Madhava R. Bodapati is a doctoral student, College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston
University. His research interests include the relationship between state policy and jail overcrowding, and parole decision-making.
t The authors gratefully acknowledge Robert Dickover, Research Specialist, of the California Department of Corrections for his assistance and diligence in obtaining the data.
1. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
2. Id. at 656, 493 P.2d at 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171. In November 1972, however, the
people of California adopted a constitutional amendment by initiative declaring that the death
penalty was not "the infliction of cruel or unusual punishment within the meaning of Article I,
Section 6 [of the California Constitution]." CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 27 (1972). The amendment
was intended to overrule Anderson and has been held to be constitutional. See, e.g., People v.
Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 186, 599 P.2d 587, 613, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 307 (1979), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part,39 Cal. 3d 803, 705 P.2d 396, 218 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1985).
3. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 634-40, 493 P.2d at 883-87, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155-59. Under
the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds, a state court can shield its decision
from United States Supreme Court review if the decision clearly rests on state grounds, even
where a federal issue is involved, because a state may grant more rights to its citizens than
provided by the federal government. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983) (holding that lack of "plain statement" explaining that Michigan Supreme Court based its decision
on state search and seizure law, allowed United States Supreme Court to review decision).
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court found that capital punishment as applied in Furman,
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. In the
two states under consideration, the court held that the judge or jury had too much discretion
in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 239-40.
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which the United States Supreme Court held that capital punishment, as

administered in Furman, violated the United States Constitution.' Many
were angered at the stance taken by the California court in the Anderson

decision because the same issue was scheduled to be heard by the United
States Supreme Court in a companion case to Furman.' Ronald Reagan,
then Governor of California, stated that the California court had made

"a mockery of the constitutional processes" and had "reinforce[d] the

widespread concern of our people that some members of the judiciary
inject their own philosophy into their decision rather than carrying out
their constitutional duty to interpret and enforce the law."'
This response to Anderson illustrates that the role of the judiciary in
reviewing legislation is especially precarious in the area of the death penalty. The few scholars discussing Anderson commented on the role of the
judiciary in reviewing legislation.' The justices in Anderson were also
very cognizant of the controversy which their decision would create, and
devoted an entire section of the case to discussing the judicial function.
Chief Justice Wright noted:

Our duty to confront and resolve constitutional questions, regardless of their difficulty or magnitude, is at the very core of

our judicial responsibility. It is a mandate of the most imperative nature ....There can be no final disposition of the judicial
proceedings in these cases [where 104 prisoners await death]

unless and until this court has decided the state constitutional
question, a question which cannot be avoided by deferring to
any other court or to any other branch of government.9
5. Id. at 239-40.
6. Findley, Reaction to the Court'sRuling, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 19, 1972, at 2, col.
1. The United States Supreme Court was scheduled to hear Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813
(1972), a companion case to Furman, so people felt there was no need for the California
Supreme Court to decide the issue. Id. See also Barrett, Anderson and the JudicialFunction,
45 S.CAL. L. REv. 739, 743 (1972) (discussing public's hostile reaction to Anderson).
7. San Francisco Chron., Feb. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
8. Barrett, supra note 6, at 739 (stating that "[tihe court was acting politically... rather
than judicially"), Bell, ConstitutionalLaw-Cruel or Unusual Punishment: The Death Penalty--People v. Anderson, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1045, 1047-48 (1972) (observing that Anderson court refused to consider challenge to constitutionality of capital punishment under eighth
amendment because issue was then before United States Supreme Court); Bice, Anderson and
the Adequate State Ground, 45 S.CAL. L. Rv. 750, 766 (1972) (noting that respect for state
judicial decisions depends on perception that courts are not usurping powers of other
branches); Hastings, Recent Case: People v. Anderson, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 343, 346 (1972) (asserting that court actually disapproved of Anderson and, contrary to what critics of Anderson
stated, court refused to "legislate").
9. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 640, 493 P.2d at 887, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
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Later that year, after the Furman decision relieved the pressure
from the California Supreme Court, Chief Justice Wright stated his reasons for deciding the Anderson case:
A democratic government must do more than serve the immediate needs of the majority of its constituency-it must respect
the "enduring general values" of the society. Somehow, a democracy must tenaciously cling to its long-term concepts ofjustice regardless of the vacillating feelings experienced by a
majority of the electorate.' 0
This Research Note briefly describes the holding and reasoning of
the court in Anderson. It then examines the Anderson-commuted death
row prisoners. Who were they? How many have been paroled? How
long did they serve in prison before being released to society? And, after
their release to society, how many committed new crimes? Finally, this
Research Note concludes that based on evidence from the two decades
since Anderson, no adequate reason exists to support the imposition of
the death penalty.
II.

THE CASE

In 1965, Robert Page Anderson entered a pawn shop in San Diego,
California." Anderson, asking to examine a rifle, loaded the gun and
killed one of the pawn shop employees. 2 He also attempted to kill another employee and engaged in a shootout with the police. 3 At trial, a
jury found Anderson guilty of first degree murder, attempted murder and
robbery, and imposed the death penalty as punishment. 4 On appeal, the6
case was affirmed,'" but later reversed by the California Supreme Court'
based on Witherspoon v. Illinois. 7 A second trial was held, and Anderson again was sentenced to death.' 8 The case was again appealed to the
10. Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CALI. L. REv.
1262, 1267 (1972) (footnote omitted).
11. People v. Anderson, 64 Cal. 2d 633, 635-37, 414 P.2d 366, 367-69, 51 Cal. Rptr. 238,
239-41 (1966).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 633-34, 493 P.2d 880, 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 15455, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
15. Anderson, 64 Cal. 2d at 642, 414 P.2d at 372, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 244.

16. In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 634, 447 P.2d 117, 131, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 35 (1968),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972).
17. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The court in Witherspoon held that the prosecution may dismiss
prospective jurors with cause who admit they would be unable to impose the death penalty,
even though the penalty is required by law. Id. at 520.
18. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 633, 493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
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California Supreme Court. 9
The first issue the California Supreme Court addressed in Anderson's second appeal was the standard used to judge the constitutionality
of capital punishment.20 The court noted that article I, section 6 of the
California Constitution used the disjunctive form, prohibiting punishment that is either cruel or unusual. 21 This differs from the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits punishment that is both cruel and unusual. 22 The court ruled on the constitutionality of the death penalty under the state constitution. 23 Using this
disjunctive form, if capital punishment is found to be either cruel or unusual, the court noted, it is unconstitutional.2 4
In determining if the punishment was indeed cruel, the court first
noted that "cruel or unusual" does not have a static definition.25 Instead,
the court stated that the California Constitution is a progressive document, 26 and that acceptable punishment must be measured by "the evolv' 27
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
The Anderson court noted that forty-one state constitutions contained
provisions for capital punishment, and public opinion polls showed that
the majority of the public supported capital punishment. 28 The court
reasoned, however, that the decreasing frequency of executions across
the country was evidence that capital punishment had fallen below the
standard of decency in modem society. 29 The court also noted that the
"brutalizing psychological effects" caused by lengthy delays between
conviction and execution was further evidence of the cruelty of this punishment.30 Concessions by the prosecutors in Anderson that capital punishment was indeed cruel, but that it was not "unnecessarily cruel," did
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 633, 493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1879,
amended 1974)). The California Constitution was amended in 1974 and the prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment is now located in article I, section 17. CAL CONST. art. I,

§ 17.
22. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 634 n.3, 493 P.2d at 883 n.3, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.3 (citing
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
23. Id. at 634, 493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 648, 493 P.2d at 893, 100 Cal. Rtpr. at 165.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 647, 493 P.2d at 893-94, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 649, 493 P.2d at 894, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
30. Id. at 650, 493 P.2d at 895, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
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not fare well with the court.3 1 The court did not address whether protection under the California Constitution was limited to an "unnecessarily
cruel" standard, but held that capital punishment did not serve any of
32
the four purposes of punishment.
The court next determined whether the punishment was unusual by
contemporary worldwide standards. 33 After noting the worldwide movement toward abolition of the death penalty, and the decreasing number
of executions in this country, the court concluded that capital punishment was "unusual" among civilized nations.3 4
Even though the court decided the case on state constitutional
grounds, which prohibit any punishment that is either cruel or unusual,
the California Supreme Court found the death penalty to be both cruel
and unusual punishment in Anderson.35 While the United States
Supreme Court did not agree that the punishment in itselfwas cruel and
unusual,3 6 the Court did find, four months later in Furman v. Georgia,37
that the arbitrary and capricious administration of capital punishment,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment.38
III.

METHODOLOGY

To identify the Anderson-commutees, the California Department of
Corrections (CDC) prepared a list of 107 inmates on death row at the
time of Anderson. 39 After receiving the list, we re-contacted the CDC to
obtain updates of the former capital prisoners. The necessary research
agreements were signed and our project was then officially approved.
Once approved, Mr. Robert Dickover, Chief, Research Branch in the
CDC, provided the researchers with the following information on the
prisoners:
1. Current status (e.g., still incarcerated, deceased, on parole);
31. Id. at 651, 493 P.2d at 895, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167.

32. Id., 493 P.2d at 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 168. The four purposes of punishment are: (1)
rehabilitation, (2) retribution, (3) isolation of the offender, and (4) deterrence of crime. Id.,
493 P.2d at 895-96, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68.
33. Id. at 653-56, 493 P.2d at 897-99, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 169-71.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 633, 493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
36. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 (1972).
37. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
38. Id. at 239-40.
39. California Department of Corrections, Unpublished data from Division of Institutional Research (1990) [hereinafter CDC Data] (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
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Recidivism data of those released (e.g., technical violations, new

felonies);
3.

Previous felony convictions of those released.

Once the data was assembled, it was computerized for analysis. 40
IV.

ANALYSIS OF RECIDIVISM AMONG ANDERSON-COMMUTED
INMATES

The public was fearful after the decision in People v. Anderson 4 1 for

two reasons. First, some thought that abolition of capital punishment
left the criminal justice system without a real deterrent, thereby facilitating future murders.4 2 Second, the public feared the release of many infamous criminals. 43 Among those affected by Anderson were such
notorious criminals as Sirhan Sirhan and Charles Manson.' Have these
former murderers and death row inmates posed the threat to society that
many believed they would?

Studies of the recidivism of violent offenders indicate that a recurrence of violence is rare.45 Additionally, studies of murderers in general
46
have found their rates of committing new offenses to be very low.

The research examining the behavior of capital offenders commuted

49
48
by the Furman v. Georgia4 7 decision in both Kentucky and Texas

have made similar discoveries.5 0 These analyses are different from the
40. Id.
41. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
42. See Findley, supra note 6, at 2, col.3.
43. Id. col. 5.
44. Draper, The Death Row Inmates, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 19, 1972, at 2, col. 1; see
also People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 717, 755, 497 P.2d 1121, 1125, 1151, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385,
389, 415, (1972) (death sentence modified to life imprisonment as a result of Anderson), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973), overruled on other groundsin Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 216,
132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 336 (1976) (death penalty verdict nullified as a result of Anderson), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977).
45. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RETURNING TO PRISON 3
(1984) [hereinafter Wallerstedt Study] (study of recidivism by John F. Wallerstedt, Ph.D,
showing murderers have second lowest recidivism rate); J. COKER & J. MARTIN, LICENSED TO
LIVE 95-97 (1985); T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH 103-20 (1980).
46. Wallerstedt Study, supra note 45, at 3. Additionally, the rate of new homicides among

released first-degree murderers tends to be about one percent. Early studies of commuted
capital offenders also noted the rarity of a second homicide. Id. at 4.
47. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
48. Vito & Wilson, Back From the Dead: Tracking the Progressof Kentucky's FurmanCommuted Death Row Population, 5 JUST. Q. 101 (1988).
49. Marquart & Sorensen, Institutionaland PostreleaseBehavior of Furman-Commuted
Inmates in Texas, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 677 (1988) [hereinafter Furman-CommutedInmates],
50. Id. at 680-89; Vito & Wilson, supra note 48, at 105-09.
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earlier commutation studies because the offenders studied more recently
include a cross-section of the death row inmate population, whereas
traditional examinations focused on pardoned murderers who were often
selectively determined to be "more deserving" and less likely to repeat
such crimes.5 1 To date, one of the more comprehensive analyses of the
behavior of capital offenders released by a court decision was the national
study of Furman-commuted inmates reported in November 1989.52 The
Furman study found that of the nearly six hundred inmates tracked over
a fifteen-year period after commutation, only seven committed homicides, six while in prison, and one while on parole.53
In February 1972, there were 107 murderers on California's death
row.54 According to the CDC data, 55 the average age of offenders at the
time of the Anderson commutation was thirty-three, the youngest offender was twenty-two and the oldest was sixty. Nearly half, 46.3%,
were in their twenties, while 31.6% were in their thirties, and 22.1%
were over age forty. Two-thirds (66.7%) of the offenders were white,
26.7% black, 4.8% Hispanic, and 1.9% belonged to other races. 56 Additionally, five of the death row inmates were female and the remaining 102
were male.
Of these 107 commutees, two prisoners had been on death row since
1964, five since 1965, seven since 1966, eight since 1967, fifteen since
1968, thirteen since 1969, thirty-four since 1970, twenty since 1971, and
three since 1972." 7 These death row inmates spent an average of nearly
three years on death row before commutation. Since commutation, the
Anderson-commutees have spent an average of thirteen years in prison
over the eighteen-year period from 1972 to 1989. Just under half (fiftytwo) of the inmates are still incarcerated, and have never been released
from confinement. Twelve others died in prison. One of the forty-one
inmates who have been released from prison, through parole or straight
discharge, died a year after release.
Figure 1 illustrates the number of inmates paroled by year.
51. For a discussion of these traditional examinations see Marquart & Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-CommutedInmates: Assessing the Threat to Society From Capital
Offenders, 23 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 5, 8-10 (1989) [hereinafter A NationalStudy].
52. Id. at 5. For a collection of articles on the death penalty see generally, Symposium: The
Death Penalty Approaches the 1990's7 Where Are We Now?, 23 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1 (1989).
53. A NationalStudy, supra note 51, at 20-25.
54. See CDC Data, supra note 39.
55. Id.
56. This includes one American Indian and one Filipino. The race of two of the inmates
was not listed in the data collected. Id
57. Id.; see also Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 649 n.37, 493 P.2d at 894 n.37, 100 Cal. Rptr. at
166 n.37.
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As indicated in Figure 1, the first inmate was paroled in 1974. The peak
year for release was 1978, when seven former capital offenders were released from confinement. Five inmates were released in 1979, followed
by six in 1980. Nearly half of all the offenders released from confinement
were released during this three-year period from 1978 to 1980.
The forty-one released inmates have spent an average of six years
and eight months in the free community. The crucial question is: If the
Anderson-commuted inmates had been executed, how many crimes
against citizens would have been prevented? Table 1 compares the recidivism rate59 of the Anderson-commuted murderers' to the Furman-commuted murderers61 who have been released from prison.
Of the forty-one released offenders, 36.6% (fifteen) were returned to
prison for new offense convictions or technical violations. Thus, the Anderson-commuted murderers recidivated at a higher rate than the
Furman-commuted murderers. The reason for this higher recidivism
58. See CDC Data, supra note 39.
59. While many measures of recidivism exist, we chose to use conviction for a new felony
or misdemeanor, or return to prison for a technical violation, as indicators of recidivism.
60. See CDC Data, supra note 39.
61. See A National Study, supra note 51, at 22-26.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF THE RECIDIVISM OF THE ANDERSON- AND

FURMAN-COMMUTED MURDERERS

Release Outcome

Anderson-Commutees

Funnan-Commutees*

Total Released
41(38.3%)
188 (43.4%)
Mean Time in Community
6.7 years
5.3 years
Recidivated
38 (20.2%)
15 (36.6%)
Technical Violations
3 (7.3%)
15 (8.0%)
Misdemeanor
3 (1.6%)
2 (4.9%)
New Felony Offense
20 (10.6%)
10 (24.4%)
Murder
1
1
Rape
1
0
Robbery
1
4
Aggravated Assault
3
1
Burglary
0
4
Larceny-theft
0
3
Possession of Firearms
2
1
Drugs
3
4
Indecency with a child
1
0
*To keep the group comparable, we included only the Furman-commuted
murderers, and excluded the rapists and armed robbers.
rate is probably the longer follow-up period62 for the Anderson-commutees which was over a full year longer than the Furman-commutees.
The average (mean) time out of prison before the Anderson commutees recidivated was three years. Nine of the fifteen offenders, however, recidivated within twenty months after their release. One inmate
was out nearly eight years before returning. Table 1 also indicates the
type of recidivism, new convictions or return to prison for a technical
parole violation. Six of the recidivating offenders were given probation,
suspended sentences, jail time or fines. The remaining nine were reincarcerated. Of these nine, two have been re-released to the community.
Violent crimes committed by the Anderson-commutees include three aggravated assaults (one with attempted murder), one aggravated robbery,
one aggravated rape, and one capital murder. The person convicted of
capital murder is currently on California's death row.
This analysis reveals that the commutees committed additional acts
of violence after being released to society. Was their rate of recidivism
disproportionate to that of murderers in general? The answer to this
62. The follow-up period is the amount of time a commutee spent in the free community
before being studied.
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question is a qualified "no." Comparing recidivism rates across studies is
very difficult because many measures of recidivism exist. 3 Further, the
follow-up period of recidivism studies vary.
Table 2 compares the recidivism of the Anderson-commuted murderers to other studies measuring murderers' rates of recidivism.
TABLE 2
RECIDIVISM RATES OF THE ANDERSON-COMMUTED
MURDERERS COMPARED WITH PREVIOUS
RESEARCH

Study
Anderson-Commutees

Outcome Definitions
Conviction for:
- New Offense
- Violation

Coker and Martin

Commission of a New
Offense

Sellin

Reincarcerated for New
Offense

Stanton

Reincarcerated for:
- New Offense
- Violation

Wallerstedt

Reincarcerated for either
New Offense or Violation

Recidivism Rate
29.3%
7.3%
28.1%
4.5%

8.8%
11.6%
29.0%

Each study presented in Table 2 used a different measure of recidivism
and a different follow-up period. The Coker and Martin study tracked
the behavior of 231 discharged murderers in England over a period ranging from five to nineteen years." 4 Their measure of recidivism was the
commission of a new offense as recorded in parole files, even if the parolee was not convicted of the offense or returned to prison.6" The Coker
and Martin study is more similar to those presented in Table 1, considering a follow-up period of varying years and the measure of recidivism as
the occurrence of a new offense.66 Not surprisingly, the rates of recidivism therefore are similar.
63. For example, commission of a new offense, arrest for a new offense, conviction for a
new offense (felony or misdemeanor) or return to prison.
64. J. COKER & J. MARnN, supra note 45, at 80.
65. Id. at 92.
66. IM at 80.
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The other studies use reincarceration, either for a new offense, technical violation, or both, as a measure of recidivism.67 Sellin reported resuits of a three-year follow-up study of 6,835 male willful homicide
convicts paroled from 1969 through 1973.68 He found only a 4.5% reincarceration rate for new offenses.69 Stanton examined the behavior of
577 first and second degree murderers released from prison in New York
from 1930 through 1961 and found a 20.5% reincarceration rate during
follow-up periods varying from zero to thirty years.70 Wallerstedt reported the median reincarceration rate of 22.6% for homicide offenders
in several states over varying time periods.7 1 As also indicated in Table
2, those studies that defined recidivism as reincarceration rather than
commission of a new offense, found a slightly lower rate of recidivism.7 2
V.

CONCLUSION

From this brief look at the Anderson-commuted inmates, one may
draw either of two conclusions. The first is that the Anderson court
should never have released these offenders to society. As a result of the
decision to commute, one offender killed again, another raped, another
robbed and others assaulted people in the free society. The second conclusion, however, is that although a few brutal acts were committed by a
minority of the Anderson-commutees, these acts have been no more numerous or violent than those committed by other murderers released
from prisons across America every day. It is the second conclusion that
is supported by the evidence. While violence tends to be a patterned
behavior for some individuals, recurrences of serious violence, such as
homicide, are a rarity, not the norm.

67. T. SELLIN, supra note 45, at 115; Stanton, Murdererson Parole, 15 CRIME & DELINQ.
149 (1969); Wallerstedt Study, supra note 45, at 1.
68. T. SELLIN, supra note 45, at 115.

69. Id. at 114.
70. Stanton, supra note 67, at 150 (finding recidivism rate of 4.76% for first degree murderers and 22.4% for second degree murderers).
71. Wallerstedt Study, supra note 45, at 3.
72. Id. at 5-6.
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